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Abstract—Speaker recognition (SR) is widely used in our daily
life as a biometric authentication or identification mechanism.
The popularity of SR brings in serious security concerns, as
demonstrated by recent adversarial attacks. However, the impacts
of such threats in the practical black-box setting are still open,
since current attacks consider the white-box setting only.
In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive and sys-
tematic study of the adversarial attacks on SR systems (SRSs)
to understand their security weakness in the practical black-
box setting. For this purpose, we propose an adversarial attack,
named FAKEBOB, to craft adversarial samples. Specifically, we
formulate the adversarial sample generation as an optimization
problem, incorporated with the confidence of adversarial samples
and maximal distortion to balance between the strength and
imperceptibility of adversarial voices. One key contribution is to
propose a novel algorithm to estimate the score threshold, a fea-
ture in SRSs, and use it in the optimization problem to solve the
optimization problem. We demonstrate that FAKEBOB achieves
close to 100% targeted attack success rate on both open-source
and commercial systems. We further demonstrate that FAKEBOB
is also effective (at least 65% untargeted success rate) on both
open-source and commercial systems when playing over the air
in the physical world. Moreover, we have conducted a human
study which reveals that it is hard for human to differentiate the
speakers of the original and adversarial voices. Last but not least,
we show that three promising defense methods for adversarial
attack from the speech recognition domain become ineffective on
SRSs against FAKEBOB, which calls for more effective defense
methods. We highlight that our study peeks into the security
implications of adversarial attacks on SRSs, and realistically
fosters to improve the security robustness of SRSs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Speaker recognition [1] is an automatic technique to identify
a person from utterances which contain audio characteris-
tics of the speaker. Speaker recognition systems (SRSs) are
ubiquitous in our daily life, ranging from biometric authen-
tication [2], [3], forensic tests [4], to personalized service
on smart devices [5]. Machine learning techniques are the
mainstream method for implementing SRSs [6], however, they
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks (e.g., [7], [8], [9]). Hence,
it is vital to understand the security implications of SRSs under
adversarial attacks.
Though the success of adversarial attack on image recog-
nition systems has been ported to the speech recognition
systems in both the white-box setting (e.g., [8], [9]) and
black-box setting (e.g., [10], [11]), relatively little research
has been done on SRSs. Essentially, the speech signal of an
utterance consists of two major parts: the underlying text and
the characteristics of the speaker. To improve the performance,
speech recognition will minimize speaker-dependent variations
to determine the underlying text or command, whereas speaker
recognition will treat the phonetic variations as extraneous
noise to determine the source of the speech signal. Thus,
adversarial attacks tailored to speech recognition systems may
become ineffective on SRSs.
An adversarial attack on SRSs aims at crafting a sample
from a voice uttered by some source speaker, so that it is mis-
classified as one of the enrolled speakers (untargeted attack) or
a target speaker (targeted attack) by the system under attack,
but still correctly recognized as the source speaker by ordinary
users. Though current adversarial attacks on SRSs [12], [13]
are promising, they suffer from the following three limitations:
(1) They are limited to the white-box setting by assuming the
adversary has access to the information of the target SRS.
Attacks in a more realistic black-box setting are still open. (2)
They only consider either the close-set identification task [12]
that always classifies an arbitrary voice as one of the enrolled
speakers [14], or the speaker verification task [13] that checks
if an input voice is uttered by the unique enrolled speaker or
not [15]. Attacks on the open-set identification task [16], which
strictly subsumes both close-set identification and speaker
verification, are still open. (3) They do not consider over-
the-air attacks, hence it is unclear whether their attacks are
still effective when playing over the air in the physical world.
Therefore, in this work, we investigate the adversarial attack
on all the three tasks of SRSs in the practical black-box setting,
in an attempt to understand the security weakness of SRSs
under adversarial attack in practice.
In this work, we focus on the black-box setting, which as-
sumes that the adversary can obtain at most the decision result
and scores of the enrolled speakers for each input voice. Hence
attacks in the black-box setting is more practical yet more
challenging than the existing white-box attacks [12], [13].
We emphasize that the scoring and decision-making mech-
anisms of SRSs are different among recognition tasks [17].
Particularly, we consider 40 attack scenarios (as demonstrated
in Fig. 2) in total differing in attack types (targeted vs.
untargeted), attack channels (API vs. over the air), genders
of source and target speakers, and SR tasks (cf. Section II-B).
To launch such a practical attack, two technical challenges
need to be addressed: (1) crafting adversarial samples as less
imperceptible as possible in the black-box setting, and (2)
making the attack practical, namely, adversarial samples are
effective on an unknown SRS, even when playing over the
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air in the physical world. In this paper, we propose a practical
black-box attack, named FAKEBOB, which is able to overcome
these challenges. More information on FAKEBOB please refers
to https://sites.google.com/view/fakebob.
Specifically, we formulate the adversarial sample generation
as an optimization problem. The optimization objective is
parameterized by a confidence parameter and the maximal
distortion of noise amplitude in L∞ norm to balance between
the strength and imperceptibility of adversarial voices, instead
of using noise model [9], [18], [19], due to its device- and
background-dependency. To solve the optimization problem,
we leverage an efficient gradient estimation algorithm, i.e., the
natural evolution strategy (NES) [20]. However, even with the
estimated gradient, none of the existing gradient-based white-
box methods (e.g., [21], [7], [9], [22]) can be directly used to
attack SRSs. This is due to the score threshold, a feature in
SRSs, leading to a failed attack when the resulted score is less
than the threshold. To this end, we propose a novel algorithm
to estimate the threshold, based on which we leverage the
Iterative Gradient Sign (IGS) method [7] with an estimated
gradient to solve the optimization problem.
We evaluate FAKEBOB for its attacking capabilities, on two
SRSs (i.e., ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM) in the popular
open-source platform Kaldi [23] in the research community
and two commercial systems (i.e., Talentedsoft [24] and Mi-
crosoft Azure [25]) which are proprietary without any publicly
available information about the internal design and implemen-
tations, hence completely black-box. We evaluate FAKEBOB
using 13 representative attack scenarios (out of 40) based
on the following five aspects: (1) effectiveness/efficiency, (2)
transferability, (3) practicability, (4) imperceptibility, and (5)
robustness.
The results show that FAKEBOB achieves 99% targeted
attack success rate (ASR) on all the tasks of both ivector-
PLDA and GMM-UBM systems, and 100% ASR on the
commercial system Talentedsoft within 2500 queries on av-
erage (cf. Section V-B). To demonstrate the transferability,
we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of transferability
attack on ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems under cross-
architecture, cross-dataset, and cross-parameter circumstances
and the commercial system Microsoft Azure. FAKEBOB is
able to achieve more than 50% transferability attack rate on all
the systems by crafting high-confidence adversarial samples.
To further demonstrate the practicability and imperceptibility,
we launch an over-the-air attack in the physical world and
also conduct a human study on the Amazon Mechanical Turk
platform [26]. The results indicate that FAKEBOB is effective
when playing over the air in the physical world against both the
open-source systems and Microsoft Azure (cf. Section V-D)
and it is hard for humans to differentiate the speakers of the
original and adversarial voices (cf. Section V-E).
Finally, we investigate four defense methods that are re-
ported promising in speech recognition domain: audio squeez-
ing [9], [27], local smoothing [27], quantization [27] and
temporal dependency-based detection [27], due to lacking of
domain-specific defense solutions for adversarial attack on
SRSs. We implement and test the first three defense methods
against our attacks, as speaker recognition does not have
temporal dependency in general [17]. The results demonstrate
that these three defense methods are ineffective on FAKEBOB,
indicating that FAKEBOB is a practical and powerful adversar-
ial attack on SRSs even in the physical world (cf. Section V-F).
Our study reveals that the security weakness of SRSs in
the practical black-box setting under adversarial attacks. This
weakness could lead to lots of serious security implications.
For instance, the adversary could launch an adversarial attack
(e.g., FAKEBOB) to bypass biometric authentication on the fi-
nancial transaction and smart devices, as well as high-security
intelligent voice control systems so that follow-up voice com-
mand attacks can be launched, e.g., CommanderSong [9] and
Hidden voice commands [28]. Even for commercial systems,
it is a significant threat under such a practical adversarial
attack, which calls for more robust SRSs. To shed further
light, we discuss the potential mitigation and further attacks to
understand the arm race in this topic. In summary, our main
contributions are:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of
adversarial attacks on SRSs in the black-box setting. Our
attack is launched by not only using gradient estimation
based methods, but also incorporating the score threshold
into the adversarial sample generation. The proposed algo-
rithm to estimate the score threshold is unique in speaker
recognition systems.
• Our black-box attack addresses not only the speaker recog-
nition tasks considered by existing white-box attacks but
also the more general task, open-set identification, which
has not been considered by existing adversarial attacks.
• Our attack is demonstrated to be effective on both the
popular open-source systems and commercial system Tal-
entedsoft, transferable and practical on both the popular
open-source systems and commercial system Microsoft
Azure even when playing over the air in the physical world.
• Our attack is robust against three potential defense methods
which are reported very promising in speech recognition
domain. Our study reveals the security implications of the
adversarial attack on SRSs, which calls for more robust
SRSs and more effective domain-specific defense methods.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the preliminaries of speaker
recognition systems (SRSs) and the threat model.
A. Speaker Recognition System (SRS)
Speaker recognition is an automatic technique that allows
machines to recognize a person’s identity based on his/her
utterances using the characteristics of the speaker. It has
been studied actively for four decades [17], and currently
supported by a number of open-source platforms (e.g., Kaldi,
MSR Identity [29] and SIDEKIT [30]), and commercial so-
lutions (e.g., Microsoft Azure, Amazon Alexa [31], Google
home [32], Talentedsoft, iFLYTEK [33], Tencent VPR [34]
2
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Fig. 1: Overview of a typical SRS
and SpeechPro VoiceKey [35]). In addition, NIST actively
organizes the Speaker Recognition Evaluation [36] since 1996.
Overview of SRSs. Fig. 1 shows an overview of a typical
SRS, which includes five key modules: Feature Extraction,
Universal Background Model (UBM) Construction, Speaker
Model Construction, Scoring Module and Decision Module.
The top part is an offline phase, while the lower two parts
are an online phase composed of speaker enrollment and
recognition phases.
In the offline phase, a UBM is trained using the acoustic
feature vectors extracted from the background voices (i.e.,
voice training dataset) by the feature extraction module. The
UBM, intending to create a model of the average features of
everyone in the dataset, is widely used in the state-of-the-art
SRSs to enhance the robustness and improve efficiency [1]. In
the speaker enrollment phase, a speaker model is built using
the UBM and feature vectors of enrolling speaker’s voices for
each speaker. During the speaker recognition phase, given an
input voice x, the scores S(x) of all the enrolled speakers are
computed using the speaker models, which will be emitted
along with the decision D(x) as the recognition result.
The feature extraction module converts a raw speech signal
into acoustic feature vectors carrying characteristics of the
signal. Various acoustic feature extraction algorithms have
been proposed such as Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients
(MFCC) [37], Spectral Subband Centroid (SSC) [38] and
Perceptual Linear Predictive (PLP) [39]. Among them, MFCC
is the most popular one in practice [1], [17].
Speaker recognition tasks. There are three common recogni-
tion tasks of SRSs: open-set identification (OSI) [16], close-set
identification (CSI) [14] and speaker verification (SV) [15].
An OSI system allows multiple speakers to be enrolled
during the enrollment phase, forming a speaker group G. For
an arbitrary input voice x, the system determines whether x
is uttered by one of the enrolled speakers or none of them,
according to the scores of all the enrolled speakers and a preset
(score) threshold θ. Formally, suppose the speaker group G has
n speakers {1, 2, · · · , n}, the decision module outputs D(x):
D(x) =
{
argmax
i∈G
[S(x)]i, if max
i∈G
[S(x)]i ≥ θ;
reject, otherwise.
where [S(x)]i for i ∈ G denotes the score of the voice x that
is uttered by the speaker i. Intuitively, the system classifies the
input voice x as the speaker i if and only if the score [S(x)]i of
the speaker i is the largest one among all the enrolled speakers,
and not less than the threshold θ. If the largest score is less
than θ, the system directly rejects the voice, namely it is not
uttered by any of the enrolled speakers.
CSI and SV systems accomplish similar tasks as the OSI
system, but with some special settings. A CSI system never
rejects any input voices, i.e., an input will always be classified
as one of the enrolled speakers. Whereas an SV system can
have exactly one enrolled speaker and checks if an input voice
is uttered by the enrolled speaker, i.e., either accept or reject.
Text-Dependency. SRSs can be either text-dependent, where
cooperative speakers are required to utter one of pre-defined
sentences, or text-independent, where the speakers are allowed
to speak anything. The former achieves high accuracy on
short utterances, but always requires a large amount utterances
repeating the same sentence, thus it is only used in the SV
task. The latter may require longer utterances to achieve high
accuracy, but practically it is more versatile and can be used
in all tasks (cf. [17]). Therefore, in this work, we mainly
demonstrate our attack on text-independent SRSs. Remark that
our attack is generic and able to attack text-dependent SRSs,
which has been demonstrated on Microsoft Azure.
SRS implementations. ivector-PLDA [40], [41] is a main-
stream method for implementing SRSs in both academia [23],
[42], [43] and industries [34], [44], [45], [46]. It achieves
the state-of-the-art performance for all the speaker recognition
tasks [47], [48]. Another approach is GMM-UBM based meth-
ods, which train a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) [15], [49]
as UBM. Basically, GMM-UBM tends to provide comparative
(or higher) accuracy on short utterances [50].
Recently, deep neural network (DNN) becomes used in
speech [51] and speaker recognition [52], [53], where speech
recognition aims at determining the underlying text or com-
mand of the speech signal. However, the major breakthroughs
made by DNN-based methods reside in speech recognition;
for speaker recognition, ivector-PLDA based methods still
exhibit the state-of-the-art performance [6]. Moreover, DNN-
based methods usually rely on a much larger amount of
labeled training dataset, which could greatly increase the
computational complexity of training compared with ivector-
PLDA and GMM-UBM based methods [54], thus are not
suitable for off-line speaker enrollment on client-side devices.
B. Threat Model
We assume that the adversary wants to craft an adversarial
sample from a voice uttered by some source speaker, so that
it is classified as one of the enrolled speakers (untargeted
attack) or the target speaker (targeted attack) by the SRS
under attack, but is still recognized as the source speaker by
ordinary users. Such an attack can be used to bypass biometric
authentication on financial transaction and smartphones, as
well as high-security intelligent voice control systems so
that follow-up voice command attacks can be launched, e.g.,
CommanderSong [9] and Hidden voice commands [28].
In this paper, we focus on the practical black-box setting
where the adversary has access only to the recognition result
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Fig. 2: Attack scenarios, where ∗ means that targeted and
untargeted are the same on the SV task, as an SV system
only has one enrolled speaker.
(decision result and scores) of a target SRS for each test
input, but not the internal configurations or training/enrollment
voices. We emphasize that our black-box setting is feasible in
practice, e.g., the SV task in the commercial system Talent-
edsoft [24] satisfies our black-box setting. This assumption
renders all previous adversarial attacks impractical on SRSs,
to the best of our knowledge.
Specifically, in our attack model, we consider five param-
eters: attack type (targeted vs. untargeted attack), genders of
speakers (inter-gender vs. intra-gender), attack channel (API
vs. over-the-air), speaker recognition task (OSI vs. CSI vs. SV)
and output of the target SRS (decision and scores vs. decision-
only) as shown in Fig. 2. Intra-gender (resp. inter-gender)
means that the genders of the source and target speakers are
the same (resp. different). API attack assumes that the target
SRS (e.g., Talentedsoft) provides an API interface to query,
while over-the-air means that attacks should be played over
the air in the physical world. To demonstrate the over-the-air
attack, we use a built-in loudspeaker of a laptop (Lenovo) to
play voices, and a built-in receiver of a mobile phone (OPPO)
to record the air-transmitted voices (the distance between
them is 0.5 meter [9]), finally, the recorded voices are fed
to the system via API. Decision-only attack means that the
target SRS (e.g., Microsoft Azure) only outputs decision result
(i.e., the adversary can obtain the decision result D(x)), but
not the scores of the enrolled speakers. Therefore, targeted,
inter-gender, over-the-air and decision-only attacks are the
most practical yet the most challenging ones. In summary,
by counting all the possible combinations of the parameters
in Fig. 2, there are 48 = 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 × 2 attack scenarios.
Since targeted and untargeted attacks are the same on the SV
task, we consider total 40 = 48− 2× 2× 2 attack scenarios.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we start with the motivations, then explain
the design philosophy of our attack in black-box setting and
the possible defenses, finally present an overview of our attack.
A. Motivation
The research in this work is motivated by the following
questions: (Q1) How to launch an adversarial attack against all
the tasks of SRSs in the practical black-box setting? (Q2) Is it
feasible to craft robust adversarial voices that are transferable
to an unknown SRS under cross-architecture, cross-dataset and
cross-parameter circumstances, and commercial systems, even
when played over the air in the physical world? (Q3) Is it
possible to craft human-imperceptible adversarial voices that
are difficult, or even impossible, to be noticed by ordinary
users? (Q4) If such an attack exists, can it be defended?
B. Design Philosophy
To address Q1, we investigate existing methods for black-
box attacks on image/speech recognition systems, i.e., surro-
gate model [55], gradient estimation [56], [20] and genetic
algorithm [57], [58]. Surrogate model methods are proved to
be outperformed by gradient estimation methods [56], hence
are excluded. For the other two methods: it is known that nat-
ural evolution strategy (NES) based gradient estimation [20]
requires much fewer queries than finite difference gradient
estimation [20], and particle swarm optimization (PSO) is
proved to be more computationally efficient than other genetic
algorithms [57], [59]. To this end, we conduct a comparison
experiment on an OSI system using NES as a black-box gradi-
ent estimation technique and PSO as a genetic algorithm. The
result shows that the NES-based gradient estimation method
obviously outperforms the PSO-based one (cf. Appendix A).
Therefore, we exploit the NES-based gradient estimation.
However, even with the estimated gradient, none of the
existing gradient based white-box methods (e.g., [21], [7],
[60], [61], [9], [19], [18], [22]) can be directly used to attack
SRSs. This is due to the threshold θ which is used in the OSI
and SV tasks, but not in image/speech recognition. As a result,
these methods will fail to mislead SRSs when the resulted
score is less than θ. To solve this challenge, we incorporate the
threshold θ into our adversarial sample generation and propose
a novel algorithm to estimate θ in the black-box setting.
Theoretically, the adversarial samples crafted in the above
way are effective if directly fed as input to the target SRS
via exposed API. However, to launch a practical attack as in
Q2, adversarial samples should be played over the air in the
physical world to interact with a SRS that may differ from the
SRS on which adversarial samples are crafted. To address Q2,
we increase the strength of adversarial samples and the range
of noise amplitude, instead of using noise model [9], [18],
[19], due to its device- and background-dependency. We have
demonstrated that our approach is effective in transferability
attack even when playing over the air in the physical world.
To address Q3, we should consider two aspects of the
human-imperceptibility. First, the adversarial samples should
sound natural when listened by ordinary users. Second, and
more importantly, they should sound as uttered by the same
speaker of the original one. As a first step towards addressing
Q3, we add a constraint onto the perturbations using L∞ norm,
which restricts the maximal distortion at each sample point
of the audio signal. We also conduct a real human study to
illustrate the imperceptibility of our adversarial samples.
To address Q4, we should launch attacks on SRSs with
defense methods. However, to our knowledge, no defense
solution exists for adversarial attacks on SRSs. Therefore, we
investigate four defense solutions for adversarial attacks on
speech recognition systems: audio squeezing [9], [27], local
smoothing [27], quantization [27] and temporal dependency-
based detection [27]. In general, the most versatile text-
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independent speaker recognition does not have such temporal
dependency [17]. Therefore, we adopt the first three defense
methods to defend against our attack.
C. Overview of Our Attack: FAKEBOB
According to our design philosophy, in this section, we
present an overview (shown in Fig. 3) of our attack, named
FAKEBOB, addressing two technical challenges: (C1) crafting
human-imperceptible adversarial samples in the black-box set-
ting, and (C2) making the attack practical, namely, adversarial
samples are effective on an unknown SRS, even when playing
over the air in the physical world.
To address C1, we formulate adversarial sample generation
as an optimization problem (cf. Section IV-A), for which
specific loss functions are defined for different attack types
(i.e., targeted and untargeted) and tasks (i.e., OSI, CSI and
SV) of SRSs (cf. Sections IV-B, IV-C and IV-D). To solve the
optimization problem, we propose an approach by leveraging
a novel algorithm to estimate the threshold, NES to estimate
gradient and the IGS method with an estimated gradient. C2 is
addressed by incorporating the strength of adversarial samples
and maximal distortion (L∞ norm) of noise amplitude into the
loss functions (cf. Sections IV-B, IV-C and IV-D).
IV. OUR ATTACK: FAKEBOB
In this section, we elaborate on the techniques behind
FAKEBOB, including the problem formulation and attacks on
OSI, CSI, and SV systems.
A. Problem Formulation
Given an original voice, x, uttered by some source speaker,
the adversary aims at crafting an adversarial voice x´ = x+ δ
by finding a perturbation δ such that (1) x´ is a valid voice, (2)
δ is as human-imperceptible as possible, and (3) the SRS under
attack classifies the voice x´ as one of the enrolled speaker or
the target speaker. To guarantee that the adversarial voice x´ is a
valid voice, which relies upon the audio file format (e.g., WAV,
MP3 and AAC), our attack FAKEBOB first normalizes the
amplitude value x(i) of a voice x at each sample point i into
the range [−1, 1], then crafts the perturbation δ to make sure
−1 ≤ x´(i) = x(i) + δ(i) ≤ 1, and finally transforms x´ back
to the audio file format which will be fed to the target SRS.
Hereafter, we assume that the range of amplitude values is
[−1, 1]. To be as human-imperceptible as possible, our attack
FAKEBOB adapts L∞ norm to measure the similarity between
the original and adversarial voices and ensures that the L∞
distance ‖x´, x‖∞:= maxi{|x´(i)−x(i)|} is less than the given
I am Bob.
Open the 
door please!
Open-set
identification
+
Speaker s Original
voice
Perturbation
Adversarial 
voice
Imposter
Enrolled
Speakers
Speaker t
Reject
Fig. 4: Attack on OSI systems
maximal amplitude threshold  of the perturbation, where i
denotes sample points of the audio waveform. To successfully
fool the target SRS, we formalize the problem of finding an
adversarial voice x´ for a voice x as the following constrained
minimization problem:
argminδ f(x+ δ)
such that ‖x+ δ, x‖∞<  and x+ δ ∈ [−1, 1]n (1)
where f is a loss function. It remains to define the loss function
f and algorithm to solve the optimization problem. In the rest
of this section, we mainly address them on the OSI system,
then adapt to the CSI and SV systems.
B. Attack on OSI Systems
As shown in Fig. 4, to attack an OSI system, we want to
craft an adversarial voice x´ starting from a voice x uttered
by some source speaker (i.e., D(x) = reject) such that the
voice x´ is classified as the target speaker t ∈ G = {1, · · · , n}
by the SRS, i.e., D(x´) = t. We first present the loss function
f and then show how to solve the minimization problem.
Loss function f . To launch a successful targeted attack on an
OSI system, the following two conditions need to be satisfied
simultaneously: the score [S(x)]t of the target speaker t should
be (1) the maximal one among all the enrolled speakers, and
(2) not less than the preset threshold θ. Therefore, the loss
function f for the target speaker t is defined as follows:
f(x) = max
{
(max{θ, max
i∈G\{t}
[S(x)]i} − [S(x)]t),−κ
}
(2)
where the hyper-parameter κ, inspired by [22], intends to
control the strength of adversarial voices.
In Eq. (2), the term max{θ,maxi∈G\{t}[S(x)]i} selects the
maximal value between the threshold θ and the scores of all
the enrolled speakers except the target speaker t. (Remark
that we will show how to estimate θ later.) Consider κ = 0,
(max{θ,maxi∈G\{t}[S(x)]i}− [S(x)]t) ≤ 0 indicates that the
above two conditions are satisfied simultaneously. In contrast,
if (max{θ,maxi∈G\{t}[S(x)]i}− [S(x)]t) > 0 then [S(x)]t is
either not the largest score or less than θ, indicating a failed
attack. In general, we want to find some small perturbation
δ such that the score [S(x´)]t is the largest one, not less than
θ, and [S(x´)]t is at least κ greater than the maximal value
between θ and the second-largest score. Therefore, the larger
κ is, the stronger of the adversarial voice is.
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To launch an untargeted attack, the loss function f can be
revised as follows:
f(x) = max{(θ −max
i∈G
[S(x)]i),−κ}. (3)
Intuitively, we want to find a perturbation δ such that the the
largest score of x is at least κ greater than the threshold θ.
Solving the optimization problem. To solve the optimization
problem in Eq. (1), we use NES as a gradient estimation
technique and employ the IGS method with the estimated
gradient to craft adversarial examples. Specifically, the IGS
method begins by setting x´i = 0 and then on the ith iteration,
x´i = clipx,{x´i−1 − η · sign(∇xf(x´i−1))}
where η is a hyper-parameter indicating the learning rate,
and the function clipx,(x´), inspired by [7], performs per-
sample clipping of the voice x´, so the result will be in L∞ -
neighbourhood of the source voice x and will be a valid voice
after transforming back into the audio file format. Formally,
clipx,(x´) = max{min{x´, 1, x+ },−1, x− }.
To obtain the gradient ∇xf(x´i−1), we estimate the gradient
by leveraging the NES based gradient estimation [20], which
only depends on recognition result. Specifically, on the ith
iteration, we first estimate the gradient of f(x) over x´i−1
which is obtained on the (i− 1)th iteration, and then exploit
the gradient ∇xf(x´i−1) to construct a perturbation δi−1. Next,
we subtract x´i−1 by δi−1 resulting in (x´i−1 − δi−1) which is
clipped to obtain the sample x´i.
However, the IGS method with the estimated gradient alone
is not sufficient to construct adversarial examples in the black-
box setting, due to the fact that the adversary has no access
to the threshold θ used in the loss function f . To solve this
problem, we present a novel algorithm for estimating θ.
Estimating the threshold θ. To estimate the threshold, θ, in
the black-box setting, the main technical challenge is that the
estimated threshold θ´ should be no less than the threshold θ in
order to launch a successful attack, but should not exceed θ too
much, otherwise, the attack cost might become too expensive.
To solve this challenge, we propose a novel approach as shown
in Algorithm 1. Given an OSI system with the scoring S
and decision D modules, and an arbitrary voice x such that
D(x) = reject, i.e., x is uttered by some source speaker,
Algorithm 1 outputs an estimated threshold θ´.
In detail, Algorithm 1 first computes the maximal score θ´ =
maxi∈G[S(x)]i of the voice x by querying the system and then
estimates the threshold by iteratively adding a search step ∆
onto the initial value θ´. Note that the initial value θ´ must be
less than the threshold θ, otherwise D(x) 6= reject. The
search step ∆ we chose is | θ´10 |, as a tradeoff between the
precision of θ´ and efficiency of the algorithm. Indeed, the
threshold θ´ might not be precise enough if ∆ is too larger,
whereas it might not be efficient if ∆ is too smaller.
Starting from the initial value θ´, Algorithm 1 iteratively
repeats the following procedure. It first computes a loss
function f ′ obtained from the loss function f in Eq. (3) by
replacing the threshold θ with the estimated threshold θ´ and
Algorithm 1 Threshold Estimation Algorithm
Input: An arbitrary voice x such that D(x) = reject, the target OSI system
with scoring S and decision D modules
Output: Estimated threshold θ´
1: θ´ ← maxi∈G[S(x)]i; . initial threshold
2: ∆← | θ´
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|; . the search step
3: x´← x;
4: while True do
5: θ´ ← θ´ + ∆;
6: while True do
7: f ′ ← λx.max{θ´ −maxi∈G[S(x)]i,−κ}; . loss function
8: x´← clipx,{x´− η · sign(∇xf ′(x´)); . craft sample using f ′
9: if D(x´) 6= reject then; . maxi∈G[S(x´)]i ≥ θ
10: return maxi∈G[S(x´)]i;
11: if maxi∈G[S(x´)]i ≥ θ´ then break;
then computes a sample x´ according to the loss function f ′.
(Note that to estimate the threshold θ, it suffices to use the
loss function for untargeted attack.) If the system classifiers the
sample x´ as one of the enrolled speakers, i.e., D(x´) 6= reject,
then the maximal score maxi∈G[S(x´)]i of the voice x´ must be
no less than the actual unknown threshold θ. In this case, we
return the estimated threshold, θ´. Otherwise, if the maximal
score maxi∈G[S(x´)]i is less than the current threshold θ´,
we continue crafting samples using the loss function f ′ and
threshold θ´, intending to search a sample whose score is no
less than θ´. If the maximal score maxi∈G[S(x´)]i becomes no
less than the current threshold θ´, Algorithm 1 computes a new
candidate threshold θ´ by adding the search step ∆ onto θ´ and
repeats the above procedure.
One may notice that Algorithm 1 will not terminate when
D(x´) is always equal to reject. In our experiments, this never
happens (cf. Section V). Furthermore. it estimates a very close
value of the actual threshold. Remark that the actual threshold
θ, obtained from the open-source SRS, is used to evaluate the
performance of Algorithm 1 only.
C. Attack on CSI Systems
A CSI system always classifier an input voice as one of the
enrolled speakers. Therefore, we can adapt the attack on the
OSI systems by ignoring the threshold θ. Specifically, the loss
function for targeted attacking on CSI systems with the target
speaker t ∈ G is defined as:
f(x) = max
{
(maxi∈G\{t}[S(x)]i − [S(x)]t),−κ
}
Intuitively, we want to find some small perturbation δ such
that the score of the speaker t is the largest one among all the
enrolled speakers, and, [S(x)]t is at least κ greater than the
second-largest score.
Similarly, the loss function for untargeted attacking on CSI
systems is defined as:
f(x) = max{([S(x)]m −maxi∈G\{m}[S(x)]i),−κ}
where m denotes the speaker of the original voice. Intuitively,
we want to find some small perturbation δ such that the largest
score of other enrolled speakers is at least κ greater than the
score of the speaker m.
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TABLE I: Dataset for experiments
Datasets #Speaker Details
Train-1
Set 7273
Part of VoxCeleb1 [4] and the whole VoxCeleb2 [62]
used for training ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM
Train-2
Set 2411
Part of LibriSpeech [63]
used for training system C in transferability analysis
Test
Speaker
Set
5
Randomly select 5 speakers from LibriSpeech
3 female and 2 male, 5 voices per speaker,
the length of voices ranges from 3 to 4 seconds.
Imposter
Speaker
Set
4
Randomly select another 4 speakers from LibriSpeech
2 female and 2 male, 5 voices per speaker,
the length of voices ranges from 2 to 14 seconds.
TABLE II: Parameters
Parameter Value
Strength κ 0
Max iteration 1000
Max learning rate η 0.001
Min learning rate η 1e-6
Search variance
σ in NES 1e-3
Samples per
draw φ in NES 50
TABLE III: Metrics used in this work
Metric Description
Attack success
rate (ASR)
Proportion of adversarial voices that
are recognized as the target speaker
Signal-noise
ratio (SNR)
Proportion of signal power of the original
voice over that perturbation
Untargeted
success rate
(UTR) for CSI
Proportion of adversarial samples that
are not recognized as the source speaker
Untargeted
success rate
(UTR) for OSI
Proportion of adversarial samples that
are not rejected by the target system
D. Attack on SV Systems
An SV system has exactly one enrolled speaker and checks
if an input voice is uttered by the enrolled speaker or not.
Thus, we can adapt the attack on OSI systems by assuming
the speaker group G is a singleton set. Specifically, the loss
function for attacking SV systems is defined as:
f(x) = max{θ − S(x),−κ}
Intuitively, we want to find a small perturbation δ such that
the score of x being recognized as the enrolled speaker is at
least κ greater than the threshold θ.
We remark that the threshold estimation algorithm for SV
systems should be revised by replacing the loss function f ′ at
Line 7 in Algorithm 1 with the following function:
f ′ = λx.max{θ´ − S(x),−κ}.
V. ATTACK EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce the experiment design, and
then evaluate FAKEBOB for its attacking capabilities using
13 representative attack scenarios (out of 40) based on the
following five aspects: effectiveness/efficiency, transferability,
practicability, imperceptibility, and robustness.
A. Dataset and Experiment Design
Dataset. As shown in Table I, we use voices from three
widely used datasets (i.e., VoxCeleb1 [4], VoxCeleb2 [62],
and LibriSpeech [63]). To implement the state-of-the-art SRSs
for demonstrating our attack, we choose the ivector-PLDA
and GMM-UBM systems provided in the popular open-source
platform Kaldi. It obtains 7,631 stars and 3,418 forks on
github [64]. We built UBM model using the Train-1 Set as
the background voices. The OSI and CSI systems are enrolled
using five speakers from the Test Speaker Set, forming a
speaker group. The SV systems are also enrolled by five
speakers from the Test Speaker Set, resulting in 5 ivector-
PLDA systems and 5 GMM-UBM systems for the SV task.
Table II shows the parameters used in our experiments. We
conduct experiments on a server with Ubuntu 16.04 and Intel
Xeon CPU E5-2697 v2 2.70GHz with 377G RAM (10 cores).
Evaluation metrics. To evaluate the performance of our
attack, we use the metrics shown in Table III. SNR is widely
used to quantify the level of signal power to noise, so
we use it here to measure the distortion of the adversarial
sample over the original voice [9]. We use the equation,
SNR(dB)= 10 log10(Px/Pδ), to obtain SNR, where Px is the
signal power of the original voice x and Pδ is the signal
power of the perturbation δ. Larger SNR value indicates a
smaller perturbation. To evaluate the efficiency of FAKEBOB,
we use two traditional metrics: number of iterations and time.
(Note that the number of queries is the number of iterations
multiplied by samples per draw in NES, i.e., 50 in this work.)
Experiment design. To evaluate FAKEBOB, we design the
following five experiments. (1) We demonstrate the effective-
ness and efficiency on both open-source systems (i.e., ivector-
PLDA and GMM-UBM systems) and the commercial system
Talentedsoft. We also evaluate FAKEBOB under intra-gender
and inter-gender scenarios, as inter-gender attacks are usually
more difficult. (2) We demonstrate the transferability by
attacking the open-source systems with different architecture,
training dataset, and parameters, as well as the commercial
system Microsoft Azure. (3) We further demonstrate the
practicability by playing the adversarial voices over the air
in the physical world. To simulate an over-the-air attack, we
play adversarial voices through a built-in loudspeaker of a
laptop (Lenovo), record the air-transmitted voices by a built-in
receiver of a mobile phone (OPPO) (the distance between them
is 0.5 meter), and then feed the recorded voices to the target
systems via exposed API. (4) For human-imperceptibility, we
conduct a real human study through Amazon Mechanical
Turk platform (MTurk) [26], a crowdsourcing marketplace for
human intelligence, using the adversarial voices crafted by
FAKEBOB. (5) We finally evaluate whether potential defense
methods (i.e., local smoothing, quantization and audio squeez-
ing) proposed in the speech recognition domain can defend
against FAKEBOB.
Since demonstrating all the 40 attack scenarios in our attack
model (cf. Section II-B) requires huge engineering efforts,
we design our experiments to cover 13 representative attack
scenarios (cf. Appendix B). In particular, we only consider
targeted attack that is much more powerful and challenging
than untargeted attack [22], [8]. Our experiments suffice to
understand the other four parameters of the attack model, i.e.,
inter-gender vs. intra-gender, API vs. over-the-air, OSI vs. CSI
vs. SV, decision and scores vs. decision-only.
The OSI task can be seen as a combination of the CSI and
SV tasks (cf. Section II). Thus, we sometimes only report and
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TABLE IV: Six trained SRSs
Task Metrics ivector-PLDA GMM-UBM
CSI Accuracy 99.6% 99.3%
SV FRR 1.0% 5.0%
FAR 11.0% 10.4%
OSI
FRR 1.0% 4.2%
FAR 11.0% 10.4%
OSIER 0.2% 2.8%
TABLE V: Source/target speakers, where
x+y denotes intra-gender+inter-gender
Task Source Speaker(size)
Target Speaker
(size)
Samples
(x+y)
CSI Test SpeakerSet (5)
Test Speaker
Set (5) 40+60
SV Imposter SpeakerSet (4)
Test Speaker
Set (4) 50+50
OSI Imposter SpeakerSet (4)
Test Speaker
Set (5) 50+50
TABLE VI: Results of threshold esti-
mation
ivector-PLDA GMM-UBM
θ θ´ Time (s) θ θ´ Time (s)
1.45 1.47 628 0.091 0.0936 157
1.57 1.60 671 0.094 0.0957 260
1.62 1.64 686 0.106 0.1072 269
1.73 1.75 750 0.113 0.1141 289
1.84 1.87 804 0.119 0.1193 314
TABLE VII: Experiment results of FAKEBOB when  = 0.002, where #Iter refers to #Iteration.
Task
System System (Intra-gender attack) System (Inter-gender attack)
ivector-PLDA GMM-UBM ivector-PLDA GMM-UBM ivector-PLDA GMM-UBM
#Iter Time(s)
SNR
(dB)
ASR
(%) #Iter
Time
(s)
SNR
(dB)
ASR
(%) #Iter
Time
(s)
SNR
(dB)
ASR
(%) #Iter
Tine
(s)
SNR
(dB)
ASR
(%) #Iter
Time
(s)
SNR
(dB)
ASR
(%) #Iter
Time
(s)
SNR
(dB)
ASR
(%)
CSI 124 2845 30.2 99.0 40 218 29.3 99.0 92 2115 29.3 100.0 25 126 28.8 100.0 146 3340 30.8 98.0 50 278 29.62 98.0
SV 84 2014 31.6 99.0 39 241 31.4 99.0 31 751 31.7 98.0 30 185 31.7 100.0 135 3252 31.6 100.0 48 298 31.2 98.0
OSI 86 2277 31.5 99.0 38 226 31.4 99.0 32 833 31.3 98.0 31 178 31.5 100.0 140 3692 31.6 100.0 45 274 31.2 98.0
analyze the results on the OSI task due to space limitation,
which is much more challenging and representative than the
other two. The missing results can be found in the appendix.
B. Effectiveness and Efficiency
Target model training. To evaluate the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our attack, we train ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM
systems for the OSI, CSI and SV tasks. As shown in Table IV,
(1) the accuracy of ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for
the CSI task are 99.6% and 93.3%, respectively. (2) For the SV
task, we adopt two commonly-used metrics: False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) [17]. FAR is the
proportion of voices that are uttered by imposters but accepted
by the system, while FRR is the proportion of voices that are
uttered by an enrolled speaker but rejected by the system.
The threshold θ is usually chosen to satisfy FRR and/or FAR
metrics. In this experiment, θ is 1.45 for GMM-UBM and
0.091 for ivector-PLDA so that the FAR is close to 10%. (3)
For the OSI task, we consider an additional metric: Open-set
Identification Error Rate (OSIER) [16]: the rate of voices that
cannot be correctly classified. We use the same threshold θ as
for the SV task, the OSIER, FAR and FRR values for the OSI
task are shown in Table IV.
Black-box attack setting. The distance constraint  is one
of the most critical parameters of our attack. To fine-turn
, we investigate ASR, efficiency, and distortion by varying
 from 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.004, 0.003, 0.002, to 0.001, on
ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for the CSI task. The
visual distortions and tuning results are given in Appendix C
and Appendix D, respectively. As a trade-off between ASR,
efficiency, and distortion, we choose  = 0.002 in the rest of
the experiments unless explicitly stated.
The target speakers are the speakers from the Test Speaker
Set (cf. Table I), the source speakers are the speakers, from
the Test Speaker Set for CSI, and from the Imposter Speaker
Set (cf. Table I) for SV and OSI. Ideally, we will craft 100
adversarial samples using FAKEBOB for each task, where
40 intra-gender and 60 inter-gender adversarial samples for
CSI, and 50 intra-gender and 50 are inter-gender adversarial
samples for SV and OSI. The summary is shown in Table V.
Note that to diversify experiments, the source speakers of CSI
and SV/OSI are designated to be different.
Black-box attack results. The results are shown in Table VII.
Since the OSI task is more challenging and representative
than the other two, we only analyze the results of the OSI
task here. We can observe that FAKEBOB achieves 99.0%
ASR for both ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM on the OSI task.
In terms of SNR, the average SNR value is 31.5 (dB) for
ivector-PLDA and 31.4 (dB) for GMM-UBM, indicating that
the perturbation is less than 0.071% and 0.072%. Furthermore,
the average numbers of iterations and execution time are 124
and 47.4 minutes on ivector-PLDA. The average numbers of
iterations and execution time are 38 and 3.8 minutes on GMM-
UBM, much smaller than that of ivector-PLDA. These results
demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of FAKEBOB.
To understand the attack difference between intra-gender
and inter-gender, we take gender into account. The results are
also shown in Table VII. We can observe that inter-gender
attack is much more difficult (more iterations and execution
time) than intra-gender attack due to the difference between
sounds of male and female. Moreover, ASR of inter-gender
attack is also lower than that of intra-gender attack. The result
unveils that once the gender of the target speaker is known by
attackers, it is much easier to launch an adversarial attack.
To evaluate our threshold estimation algorithm (i.e., Algo-
rithm 1), we report the estimated threshold θ´ in Table VI by
setting five different thresholds θ. The estimation error is less
than 0.03 for ivector-PLDA and less than 0.003 for GMM-
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TABLE VIII: Details of source and target systems for transferability attacks
System ID A B C D E F G H I
Architecture GMM-UBM ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA ivector-PLDA
Training set Train-1 Set Train-1 Set Train-2 Set Train-1 Set Train-1 Set Train-1 Set Train-1 Set Train-1 Set Train-1 Set
Feature MFCC MFCC MFCC PLP MFCC MFCC MFCC MFCC PLP
Dimension of feature 24×3 24×3 24×3 24×3 13×3 24×3 24×3 24×3 13×3
Frame length/frame step (ms) 25/10 25/10 25/10 25/10 25/10 50/10 25/10 25/10 50/10
Num of gaussian components 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 2048 1024 2048 1024
Dimension of ivector – 400 400 400 400 400 400 600 600
TABLE IX: 16 transferability attacks
Source system A
Target system B C D E F G H I
Attack ID i ii iii iv v vi vii viii
Source system B
Target system A C D E F G H I
Attack ID ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi
Attack i 
Attack ii 
Attack xi
Attack xii
Attack xiii
Attack xiv
Attack xv
Attack xvi
Attack ix 
Attack x 
Attack iii 
Attack iv
Attack v
Attack vi
Attack vii
Attack viii
Cross 
architecture
Cross 
dataset
Cross 
parameter
Fig. 5: Transferability analysis under cross-architecture, cross-
dataset and cross-parameters circumstances
UBM. This shows that our algorithm is able to effectively
estimate the threshold in less than 13.4 minutes. Note that
our attack is black-box, and each threshold θ is accessed for
evaluating our algorithm only.
Result of attacking the commercial system Talentedsoft.
We also evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of FAKEBOB
on the commercial system, Talentedsoft, developed by the
constitutor of the voiceprint recognition industry standard of
the Ministry of Public Security (China). We query this online
platform via the HTTP post method (seen as the exposed
API). Frequently querying via HTTP would cause too heavy
traffic for the platform’s server and may lead to DOS (Denial
of Service). Therefore, we demonstrate our attack on its SV
API and enroll one randomly chosen speaker from the Test
Speaker Set (cf. Table I). We attack the system using two
randomly chosen source speakers from the Imposter Speaker
Set and five randomly chosen voices per source speaker. Our
attack successfully crafted 10 adversarial samples, achieving
100% ASR within 50 iterations (50×50=2,500 queries) on
average. This demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of
FAKEBOB on commercial systems that are completely black-
box.
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Fig. 6: Transferability results for attacks (i-viii) on the CSI
task, where r1 denotes κ = 0, r2 denotes 0 < κ < 0.07,
r3 denotes 0.07 ≤ κ < 0.1, r4 denotes 0.1 ≤ κ < 0.15, r5
denotes 0.15 ≤ κ < 0.2, r6 denotes 0.2 ≤ κ < 0.35.
C. Transferability
Transferability [65] is the property that some adversarial
samples produced to mislead a model (called source system)
can mislead other models (called target system) even if their
architectures, training dataset, or parameters differ.
Transferability attack setting. To evaluate the transferability
of the adversarial voices crafted by FAKEBOB, we regard
the GMM-UBM (system A) and ivector-PLDA (system B)
systems as source systems, we build up to seven target systems
differing in architecture, training dataset and key parameters as
shown in Table VIII, yielding 16 distinct attacks (i to xvi) (cf.
Table IX). The distribution of the attacks is shown in Fig. 5
in terms of architecture, training dataset and key parameters.
We can see that some attacks belong to multiple scenarios.
As aforementioned (cf. Section IV-B), we adjust the parame-
ter κ to control the strength/confidence of adversarial samples.
Hence, we vary the value of κ to understand the transferability.
In addition, we set  = 0.1 in this experiment as a trade-
off between the strength and imperceptibility of adversarial
voices, because high-confidence adversarial voices usually
require larger distortion which sacrifices the imperceptibility.
Transferability attack to open-source systems. As shown
in Fig. 5, attack ii (both cross-architecture and cross-dataset)
is more challenging than attack x (cross-dataset), and attacks
iii-viii (both cross-architecture and cross-parameter) are more
challenging than attacks xi-xvi (cross-parameter). Thus, we
only analyze the transferability results of eight attacks (i-viii)
here due to the space limitation. The results and analysis of
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the other attacks (ix-xvi) are attached in Appendix E.
In general, the results show that the transferability rate
increases along with the increase of κ. Specifically, (1) on the
CSI task, as shown in Fig. 6, when κ increases close to 0.35,
all the attacks achieve more than 65% ASR, and achieve nearly
80% UTR (i.e., the target system misclassifies the adversarial
samples). Even κ is less than 0.2, all the attacks are still able
to achieve nearly 50% ASR. (2) On the SV task, less than 20%
adversarial voices can be accepted by all the target systems
when κ = 0. When κ increases close to 2.7, almost all the
attacks are able to achieve nearly 60% ASR. (3) On the OSI
task, when κ increases close to 2.6, ASR ranges from 50%
(attack viii) to 95% (attack iii), and UTR ranges from 55%
(attack viii) to 95% (attack iii).
We found that the target system of attack viii is system I.
Compared with systems C-H, system I shares fewer parameters
with the source system (i.e., feature extraction algorithm, dim
of feature, frame length, etc. in Table VIII). This reveals
that the larger the difference between the source and target
systems is, the more difficult the transferability attack is. This
phenomenon also exists on the CSI and SV tasks. Due to the
lack of space, results on the OSI and SV tasks are shown in
Section E.
Transferability attack to the commercial system Microsoft
Azure. Microsoft Azure is an intelligent cloud service plat-
form with the second largest market share in the world. It
supports both the SV and OSI tasks via HTTP REST API.
Unlike Talentedsoft, Microsoft Azure’s API only returns the
decision (i.e., the predicted speaker) along with 3 confidence
levels (i.e., low, normal and high) instead of scores, so we
attack this platform via transferability. We enroll five speakers
from the Test Speaker Set to build an OSI system on Microsoft
Azure. We then test the baseline performance of this OSI
system using the voices in the Imposter Speaker Set and the
FAR is 0%. We attack Microsoft Azure using the adversarial
samples crafted on the GMM-UBM system1, resulting in
ASR=34% and UTR=57%.
Microsoft Azure also supports text-dependent SV task (10
fixed text), we create five enrollment voices via the Text-to-
Speech engine [66] based on which the GMM-UBM and Mi-
crosoft Azure systems for the SV task are built. We then craft
adversarial samples on the GMM-UBM system as the source
system and conduct a transferability attack on Microsoft Azure
as the target system. However, we found that Microsoft Azure
just reported “error, too noisy” instead of “accept” or “reject”,
so the ASR is 0%. One possible reason is that Microsoft
Azure for the SV task requires minimal SNR for input voice,
which we thought is too strict to use in practice. Indeed, we
played 50 normal voices via a built-in loudspeaker of a laptop
(Lenovo), recorded them via a built-in receiver of a mobile
phone (OPPO) with distances 0.5 meter (25 voices) and 1
meter (25 voices), and fed the recorded voices to Microsoft
1We found that adversarial voices crafted on the GMM-UBM system are
more transferable than those crafted on the ivctor-PLDA one against Microsoft
Azure. A possible reason is that it shares more features with GMM-UBM.
TABLE X: Results of the over-the-air attack
System Task AverageSNR (dB) Results
ivector-PLDA
CSI 1.9 ASR: 40%, UTR: 80%
SV -0.3 (max: 6.7) ASR: 70%
OSI -0.3 (max: 5.5) ASR: 65%, UTR: 65%
GMM-UBM
CSI 3.6 ASR: 95%, UTR: 100%
SV 2.6 AT: 75%
OSI 2.6 ASR: 90%, UTR: 90%
Azure OSI 2.2 ASR: 9%, UTR:77%
Azure via API. We surprisingly found that the system reported
“error, too noisy” for 76% of the normal voices (56% for 0.5
meter and 96% for 1 meter).
D. Practicability for Over-the-Air Attack
When launching an over-the-air attack in the physical
world, adversarial samples should be played through devices,
transmitted in the air, and finally received by the receivers.
Such an attack is more practical yet more challenging as the
noise introduced from both air channel and electronic devices
probably disrupts the perturbations of adversarial samples.
Attack setting (over the air). We attack all tasks of ivector-
PLDA and GMM-UBM systems, while attack the OSI task of
Microsoft Azure only, as its SV task is impractical for normal
voices (cf. Section V-C). We set  = 0.1, the same as in
Section V-C, so that the perturbation is comparable or greater
than the device noise, thus more robust against the noise.
To craft high-confidence adversarial samples, we set (1)
13.5 ≤ κ < 16 (ivector-PLDA) and 0.2 ≤ κ < 0.35 (GMM-
UBM) for the CSI task, (2) 6.4 ≤ κ < 7 (ivector-PLDA)
and 2.7 ≤ κ < 5 (GMM-UBM) for the SV task, and (3)
6.4 ≤ κ < 7 (ivector-PLDA) and 2.6 ≤ κ < 5 (GMM-UBM)
for the OSI task.
The experiment is conducted in a relatively quiet room (12
meters long, 8 meters wide and 4 meters tall). We do not
consider attacks under noisy environments because it is even
difficult to correctly recognize normal voices.
Results (over the air). The results of over-the-air attack are
shown in Table X. (1) For the CSI task, FAKEBOB achieves
95% ASR (i.e., the target system classifies the adversarial
voice as the target speaker) and 100% UTR (i.e., the target
system does not classify the adversarial voice as the source
speaker) on the GMM-UBM system, and achieves 40% ASR
(80% UTR) on the ivector-PLDA system. (2) For the SV
task, FAKEBOB achieves at least 70% ASR. (3) For the OSI
task, FAKEBOB is able to achieve 90% ASR on the GMM-
UBM system, which is slightly dropped to 65% on the ivector-
PLDA system. (4) On the commercial system Microsoft Azure,
77% of adversarial samples are predicted as some enrolled
speakers2, which is usually sufficient for launching an over-
2Note that 77% is higher than 57% which is the UTR of transferability
result for Microsoft Azure. The reason is that in our over-the-air evaluation,
we randomly select part of generated adversarial voices.
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the-air attack. We can also observe only 9% of adversarial
samples are predicted as the target speaker as this is the most
challenging case (i.e., targeted, over-the-air and decision-only).
In terms of SNR, the average SNR is not less than 1.9 dB
(except for the SV and OSI tasks of ivector-PLDA), and the
average SNR reaches up to 3.6 dB on the GMM-UBM system
for the CSI task, indicating that the power of the signal is 2.3
times greater than that of the noise. Thought the average SNR
on the ivector-PLDA system for the SV and OSI tasks is less
than 0 dB, but the maximal SNR is high, i.e., 6.7 dB and 5.5
dB, indicating that the power of the signal is 4.7 and 3.5 times
greater than that of the noise. It is worth mentioning that our
SNR is better than CommanderSong [9] in most cases. These
results demonstrate the effectiveness of our over-the-air attack.
E. Human-Imperceptibility via Human Study
To demonstrate the imperceptibility of adversarial samples,
we conduct a human study on MTurk. The survey is approved
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of our institutes.
Setup of human study. We recruit participants from MTurk
and ask them to choose one of the two tasks and finish the
corresponding questionnaire. Note that we do not reveal the
purpose of our study to the participants, and do not record any
personal information. The two tasks are described as follows.
• Task 1: Clean or Noisy. This task asks participants to tell
whether the playing voice is clean or noisy. Specifically,
We randomly select 12 original voices and 15 adversarial
voices crafted from other original voices, among which 12
adversarial voices are randomly selected from the voices
which become non-adversarial (called ineffective) when
playing over the air with  = 0.002 and low confidence,
and the other 3 are randomly selected from the voices
which remain adversarial (called effective) when playing
over the air with  = 0.1 and high confidence. We ask
users to choose whether a voice has any background noise
(The three options are clean, noisy, and not sure).
• Task 2: Identify the Speaker. This task asks participants to
tell whether the voices in a pair are uttered by the same
speaker. Specifically, we randomly select three speakers
(two male and one female), and randomly choose one
normal voice for each speaker (called reference voice).
Then for each speaker, we randomly select 3 normal voices,
3 distinct adversarial voices that are crafted from other
normal voices of the same speaker, and 3 normal voices
from other speakers. In summary, we build 27 pairs of
voices: 9 pairs are normal pairs (one reference voice and
one normal voice from the same speaker), 9 pairs are
other pairs (one reference voice and one normal voice
from another speaker) and 9 pairs are adversarial pairs
(one reference voice and one adversarial voice from the
same speaker). Among 9 adversarial pairs, 6 pairs contain
effective adversarial samples when playing over the air,
and 3 pair do not. We ask the participants to tell whether
the voices in each pair are uttered by the same speaker
(The three options are same, different, and not sure).
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Fig. 7: Results of human study
To ensure the quality of our questionnaire and validity of
our results, we filter out the questionnaires that are randomly
chosen by participants. In particular, we set three simple
questions in each task. For task 1, we insert three silent voices
as a concentration test. For task 2, we insert three pairs of
voices, where each pair contains one male voice and one
female voice as a concentration test. Only when all of them
are correctly answered, we regard it as a valid questionnaire,
otherwise, we exclude it.
Results of human study. We finally receive 108 valid ques-
tionnaires for task 1 and 161 valid questionnaires for task 2.
The results of the human study are shown in Fig. 7.
For task 1, on average, 33.1% of adversarial voices are
regarded as noisy by participants, only 22.4% higher than the
baseline 10.7% of normal voices, indicating that adversarial
voices crafted by FAKEBOB are not significantly noisier than
normal voices. We further investigate the difference between
the effective and ineffective adversarial voices when played
over the air. For the ineffective ones, the proportion of
voices being regarded as noisy drops to 20.2%, which is not
statistically significantly different from the baseline 10.7%,
indicating when listening to one voice alone (either original or
adversarial), participants do not believe that adversarial voices
are much noisy than original ones. For the effective ones, more
than 12% of them are regarded as clean.
For task 2 which is more interesting, 86.5% of participants
believe that voices in each other pair are uttered by different
speakers, indicating the quality of collected questionnaires. For
the adversarial pairs, 54.6% of participants believe that voices
in each pair are uttered by the same speaker, very close to
the baseline 53.7% of normal pairs, indicating that humans
cannot differentiate the speakers of the normal and adversarial
voices. For adversarial voices that become ineffective when
played over the air, 64.9% of them are believed from the same
speakers, much greater than the baseline 53.7%, thus more
imperceptible. For the other adversarial voices, 33.9% is still
believed from the same speaker, and 12.0% is not sure. The
results unveil that the adversarial voice crafted by FAKEBOB
can make systems misbehave (i.e., making a decision that the
adversarial voice is uttered by the target speaker), while for
ordinary users, it sounds like the source speaker’ voice. Hence,
our attack is very surreptitious.
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F. Robustness of FAKEBOB against Defense Methods
To our knowledge, there are no domain-specific defense
solutions against adversarial attacks on SRSs. Hence, we
implement and test three defense methods: local smoothing,
quantization, and audio squeezing from the speech recognition
domain, as discussed in Section III-B. For ease of illustration,
we only report the defense results on the GMM-UBM system
for the OSI task. We use the FRR metric to evaluate the impact
of defense method on normal voices, and the UTR metric to
evaluate defense effectiveness against adversarial voices.
Local smoothing: It mitigates adversarial attacks by applying
the mean, median or gaussian filter to the waveform of a
voice. Based on the results in [27], we use the median filter. A
median filter with kernel size k (must be odd) replaces each
audio element xk by the median of k values [xk− k−12 , . . . ,
xk, . . . , xk+ k−12 ]. We vary the kernel size k from 3 to 19
with step 2. The results are shown in Fig. 8a. Though, the
UTR of low-confidence adversarial voices drops from 99%
to nearly 0%, the minimal FRR of normal voices increases
to 35%, significantly larger than the baseline 4.17%. Further-
more, the median filter is not effective against high-confidence
adversarial voices. These results indicate that the median filter
fails to defend against FAKEBOB.
Quantization: It rounds the amplitude of each sample point of
a voice to the nearest integer multiple of factor q to mitigate the
perturbation. We vary q from 128, 256, 512 to 1024 as [27]
did. However, the system did not output any result on both
adversarial and normal voices. An in-depth analysis of the
system reveals that all the frames of adversarial and normal
voices are regarded as unvoiced frame by the Voice Activity
Detection (VAD) [67] component. This demonstrates that
quantization is not suitable for defending against FAKEBOB.
Audio squeezing: It down-samples voices and applies signal
recovery to disrupt the perturbation of adversarial voices.
We vary τ (the ratio between new and original sampling
frequency) from 0.1 to 0.9, the same as [9]. (Note that the FRR
and UTR for τ = 1 are the same as the baseline.) The results
are shown in Fig. 8b. We can observe that when τ = 0.9,
the FRR 6% of normal voices is close to the baseline 4.17%,
and the UTR of the low-confidence adversarial voices is 17%
which is much smaller than the baseline 99%. However, the
UTR of the high-confidence adversarial voices is the same as
the baseline (i.e., 99%) when τ = 0.9. These results indicate
that audio squeezing fails to defend against FAKEBOB.
VI. DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE ARM RACE
This section discusses the potential mitigation of our attacks
and possible advanced attacks.
Mitigation of FAKEBOB. We have demonstrated that three
defense methods are ineffective against FAKEBOB although
they are reported promising in the speech recognition domain.
This reveals that more effective defense methods are needed
to mitigate FAKEBOB. We discuss several possible defense
methods as follows.
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Fig. 8: Results of the defense methods: median filter and audio
squeezing where UTR-lc denotes UTR of low-confidence
adversarial voices (κ=0), and UTR-hc denotes UTR of high-
confidence adversarial voices (0 < κ < 5). Note that
FRR=4.17% and UTR=99% without defense.
Various liveness detection methods have been proposed to
detect spoofing attacks on SRSs. Such methods detect attacks
by exploiting the different physical characteristics of the voices
generated by the human speech production system (i.e., lungs,
vocal cords, and vocal tract) and electronic loudspeaker. For
instance, Shiota et al. [68] use pop noise caused by human
breath, VoiceLive [69] leverages time-difference-of-arrival of
voices to the receiver, and VoiceGesture [70] leverages the
unique articulatory gesture of the user. Adversarial voices also
need to be played via loundspeakers, hence liveness detection
could be used to detect them.
An alternative detection method is to train a detector using
adversarial voices and normal voices. Though promising in
image recognition domain [71], it has a very high false-positive
rate and does not improve the robustness when the adversary
is aware of this defense [72].
Another scheme to mitigate adversarial images is input
transformation such as image bit-depth reduction and JPEG
compression [73]. We could mitigate adversarial voices by
leveraging input transformations such as bit-depth reduction
and MP3 compression. However, Athalye et al. [74] have
demonstrated that input transformation on images can be
easily circumvented by strong attacks such as Backward Pass
Differentiable Approximation. We conjecture that bit-depth
reduction and MP3 compression may become ineffective for
high-confidence adversarial voices.
Finally, one could also improve the security of SRSs by
using a text-dependent system and requiring users to read
dynamically and randomly generated sentences. By doing so,
the adversary has to attack both the speaker recognition and
the speech recognition, hence incurring attack costs.
In our future work, we will study the above methods for
adversarial attacks. In the rest of this section, we discuss
possible methods on improving adversarial attacks.
Possible advanced attacks. For a system that outputs the
decision result and scores, FAKEBOB can directly craft ad-
versarial voices via interacting with it. However, for a system
that only outputs the decision result, we have to attack it
by leveraging transferability. When the gap between source
and target systems is larger, the transferability rate is limited.
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One possible solution to improve FAKEBOB is to leverage the
boundary attack, which is proposed to attack decision-only
image recognition systems by Brendel et al. [75].
Our human study demonstrates that adversarial voices gen-
erated by FAKEBOB is imperceptible (i.e., users cannot dif-
ferentiate the speakers of the original and adversarial voices),
indicating that restricting the maximal value of L∞ is feasible
and usually sufficient to craft imperceptible adversarial voices.
However, some of the adversarial voices are still noisier than
original voices (human study task 1). One possible solution to
improve imperceptibility is to build a psychoacoustic model
and limit the maximal difference between the spectrum of
the original and adversarial voices to the masking threshold
(hearing threshold) of human perception [76], [77].
VII. RELATED WORK
The security issues of intelligent voice systems have been
studied in the literature. In this section, we discuss the most
related work on attacks over the intelligent voice systems, and
compare them with FAKEBOB.
Adversarial voice attacks. Gong et al. [12] and Kreuk et
al. [13] respectively proposed adversarial voice attacks on
SRSs in the white-box setting, by leveraging the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) [21]. The attack in [12] addresses DNN-
based gender recognition, emotion recognition and close-set
identification systems, while the attack in [13] addresses a
DNN-based speaker verification system. Compared to these
attacks: (1) Our black-box attack FAKEBOB is more practical,
which only has access to the input and output of the target
system. (2) FAKEBOB not only addresses the speaker verifi-
cation and close-set identification but also the more general
task, open-set identification. (3) Instead of attacking DNN-
based systems, we demonstrate our attack on ivector-PLDA
and GMM-UBM systems in the popular open-source platform
Kaldi. Theoretically, our attack is generic and can be used
to attack DNN-based systems. However, their attacks did
not consider the score threshold, hence would be ineffective
on ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems. (4) Furthermore,
FAKEBOB is effective on the commercial systems, even when
playing over the air, which was not considered in [12], [13].
In a concurrent work, Abdullah et al. [78] proposed a
poisoning attack on speaker and speech recognition systems,
that is demonstrated on the open-set identification in Microsoft
Azure. There are four key differences: (1) Their goal is
to craft an adversarial voice from a voice uttered by an
enrolled speaker such that it is misclassified as another en-
rolled speaker, which is a restricted untargeted attack. Our
goal is to craft an adversarial voice from a voice uttered
by an arbitrary speaker such that it is misclassified as a
target speaker (targeted attack) or another enrolled speaker
(untargeted attack). Thus, our attack is more practical and
powerful. (2) Their attack is ineffective on speaker verification
or in a more practical setting where the adversary wants
to bypass a biometric authentication instead of hiding the
identity. (3) They craft adversarial voice by decomposing
and reconstructing an input voice, hence, achieved a limited
untargeted success rate and cannot be adapted to launch more
interesting and powerful targeted attacks. (4) We evaluate over-
the-air attacks in the physical world, but they did not.
We cannot compare the performance (i.e., effectiveness
and efficiency) of our attack with the three related works
above [12][13][78] because all of them are not available.
Adversarial attacks on speech recognition systems also have
been studied [10], [8], [79]. Nicholas et al. [8] attacked
DeepSpeech [80] by crafting adversarial voices in the white-
box setting, but failed to attack when playing over the air. In
the black-box setting, Rohan et al. [10] combined a genetic
algorithm with finite difference gradient estimation to craft
adversarial voices for DeepSpeech, but achieved a limited
success rate with strict length restriction over the voices.
Alzantot et al. [79] presented the first black-box adversarial
attack on a CNN-based speech command classification model
by exploiting a genetic algorithm. However, due to the dif-
ference between speaker recognition and speech recognition,
these works are orthogonal to our work and cannot be applied
to ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM based SRSs.
Other types of voice attacks. Other types of voice attacks
include hidden voice attack (both against speech and speaker
recognition) and spoofing attack (against speaker recognition).
Hidden voice attack aims to embed some information (e.g.,
command) into an audio carrier (e.g., music) such that the
desired information is recognized by the target system without
catching victims’ attention.
Abdullah et al. [81] proposed such an attack on speaker
and speech recognition systems. There are two key differences:
(1) Based on characteristics of signal processing and psychoa-
coustics, their attack perturbed a sample uttered by an enrolled
speaker such that it is still correctly classified as the enrolled
speaker by the target system but becomes incomprehensible to
human listening. While our attack perturbed a sample uttered
by an arbitrary speaker such that it is misclassified as a target
speaker (targeted attack) or another enrolled speaker (untar-
geted attack) but the perturbation is imperceptible to human
listening. This means that their attack addresses a different
attack scenario than ours. (2) They did not demonstrate over-
the-air attack on SRSs and their tool is not available, hence it
is unclear how effective it is on SRSs.
DolphinAttack [82], CommanderSong [9] and the work
done by Nicholas et al. [28] proposed hidden voice attacks
on speech recognition systems. Nicholas et al. launched both
black-box (i.e., inverse MFCC) and white-box (i.e., gradient
decent) attacks on GMM-HMM based speech recognition sys-
tems. DolphinAttack exploited vulnerabilities of microphones
and employed the ultrasound as the carrier of commands to
craft inaudible voices. However, it can be easily defended
by filtering out the ultrasound from voices. CommanderSong
launched white-box attacks by exploiting a gradient descent
method to embed commands into music songs.
Another attack type on SRSs is spoofing attack [83] such
as mimic [84], replay [85], voice synthesis [86], and voice
conversion [87] attacks. Spoofing attack aims at obtaining
a voice (e.g., record-and-replay) such that it is correctly
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classified as the target speaker by the system, and also sound
like the target speaker listened by ordinary users. The victim
will hear her/his own voice in spoofing attack, but hear the
source speaker’s voice in our attack. When the victim can hear
the voice used for attack, our attack is less likely to catch the
victim’s attention, thus more practical and surreptitious.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we conducted
the first comprehensive and systematic study of adversarial
attack on SRSs in a practical black-box setting, by proposing
a novel practical adversarial attack FAKEBOB. FAKEBOB
was evaluated on all the three recognition tasks in 13 attack
scenarios. FAKEBOB achieved close to 100% targeted attack
success rate on both open-source and commercial systems
(e.g., Talentedsoft). We also demonstrated the transferability
of FAKEBOB on Microsoft Azure. When played over the
air in the physical world, FAKEBOB achieved at least 65%
untargeted success rate. Our findings reveal the security im-
plications of FAKEBOB for SRSs, calling for more robust
defense methods to better secure SRSs against such practical
adversarial attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Comparison of our FAKEBOB and PSO-based Method
In this section, we compare our attack FAKEBOB over a
PSO-based method. We reduce the finding of an adversarial
sample as an optimization problem (cf. Section IV-A), then
solve the optimization problem via the PSO algorithm.
PSO solves the optimization problem by imitating the
behaviour of a swarm of birds [88]. Each particle is a candidate
solution, and in each iteration, the particle updates itself by
the weighted linear combination of three parts, i.e., inertia,
local best solution and global best solution. The related
weights are initial inertia factor winit, final inertia factor wend,
acceleration constant c1 and c2.
We implement a PSO-based attack following the algorithm
of Sharif et al. [57] which is used to fool face recognition
systems. After fine-tuning the above hyper-parameters, we
conduct the experiment using the PSO-based method with 50
particles for a maximum of 35 epochs, and we set the iteration
limitation of each epoch to 30, winit to 0.9, wend to 0.1, c1
to 1.4961 and c2 to 1.4961. The experiment is conducted on
the ivector-PLDA system for the OSI task.
The results are shown in Table XI. For comparison purposes,
we also report the results of our attack FAKEBOB in Table XI.
Overall, the PSO-based method achieves 33% targeted attack
success rate (ASR), only one-third of FAKEBOB, indicating
that FAKEBOB is much more effective than the PSO-based
method. Specifically, the PSO-based method is less effective
for input voices whose initial scores are low.
• When [S(x0)]t ≤ −0.5, the PSO-based method fails to
launch attack for all the voices.
• When −0.5 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 0 and 0 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 0.5, the
ASR is very low, i.e., 5.3% and 17.6%, respectively.
Whereas our attack FAKEBOB is more effective no matter the
initial scores of input voices.
In terms of efficiency, FAKEBOB takes less number of
iterations and execution time than the PSO-based method,
except for the case −0.5 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 0 on which the
PSO-based method is only able to launch a successful attack
for one voice. Specifically, the higher the initial score of the
input voice is, the more efficient of our attack FAKEBOB
is compared to the PSO-based method. For instance, when
0.5 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 1, the number of iterations (resp. execution
time) of the PSO-based method is 17 times (resp. 15 times)
larger than the one of FAKEBOB.
In summary, the experimental results demonstrate that our
attack FAKEBOB is much more effective and efficient than the
PSO-based method.
B. 13 Attack Scenarios
All of following combinations are evaluated under targeted
attack.
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TABLE XI: Comparison of attack effectiveness and efficiency between our attack FAKEBOB and the PSO-based method,
where [S(x0)]t denotes the initial score of the speaker t for the input voice x0, and ∗ denotes that only one adversarial attack
succeeds.
−∞ < [S(x0)]t <∞ [S(x0)]t ≤ −0.5 −0.5 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 0 0 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 0.5 0.5 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 1 1 < [S(x0)]t ≤ 1.5
FAKEBOB PSO FAKEBOB PSO FAKEBOB PSO∗ FAKEBOB PSO FAKEBOB PSO FAKEBOB PSO
#Iteration 86 136 187 — 84 72 61 147 17 297 4 24
Time (s) 2277 2524 4409 — 1947 1311 1384 2715 357 5517 77 449
SNR (dB) 31.5 31.9 31.4 — 30.5 22.8 31.5 31.6 32.4 32.3 31.8 32.2
ASR (%) 99.0 33.0 96.3 0.0 100.0 5.3 100.0 17.6 100.0 60.0 94.1 100.0
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Fig. 9: Illustration of visual distortions for different values of the parameter 
TABLE XII: Results of tuning the parameter  on the CSI task

ivector-PLDA GMM-UBM
#Iteration Time (s) SNR (dB) ASR (%) #Iteration Time (s) SNR (dB) ASR (%)
0.05 18 422 12.0 100 18 91 16.7 100
0.01 23 549 16.2 100 16 81 19.1 100
0.005 44 1099 21.8 100 19 102 22.3 100
0.004 56 1423 23.8 100 21 104 24.0 100
0.003 76 2059 26.3 100 27 124 26.1 100
0.002 124 2845 30.2 99 40 218 29.3 99
0.001 276 6738 36.4 41 106 551 35.7 87
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Fig. 10: Transferability results of attacks (i-viii) on the OSI task, where r1
denotes κ = 0, r2 denotes 0 < κ < 0.9, r3 denotes 0.9 ≤ κ < 1.4, r4
denotes 1.4 ≤ κ < 2, r5 denotes 2 ≤ κ < 2.6, r6 denotes 2.6 ≤ κ < 5.
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Fig. 11: Transferability result for at-
tacks (i-viii) on the SV task, where
r1 denotes κ = 0, r2 denotes 0 <
κ < 0.9, r3 denotes 0.9 ≤ κ < 1.4,
r4 denotes 1.4 ≤ κ < 2, r5 denotes
2 ≤ κ < 2.7, r6 denotes 2.7 ≤ κ < 5.
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TABLE XIV: Transferability results of attacks (ix-xvi) (source system: system B) on the CSI task
Adversarial
Strength
Attack ix Attack x Attack xi Attack xii Attack xiii Attack xiv Attack xv Attack xvi
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
κ = 0 17.0 52.0 6.0 18.0 8.0 16.0 13.0 40.0 10.0 20.0 10.0 20.0 26.0 35.0 6.0 24.0
0 < κ < 16 32.6 84.8 85.1 92.8 96.0 97.6 80.0 95.2 92.0 97.6 95.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 84.0 91.2
TABLE XV: Transferability results of attacks (ix-xvi) (source system: system B) on the SV task
Adversarial
Strength
Attack ix Attack x Attack xi Attack xii Attack xiii Attack xiv Attack xv Attack xvi
ASR (%) ASR (%) ASR (%) ASR (%) ASR (%) ASR (%) ASR (%) ASR (%)
κ = 0 2.0 7.0 2.0 11.0 15.0 16.0 7.0 8.0
0 < κ < 7 6.0 53.0 99.0 77.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 55.0
TABLE XVI: Transferability results of attacks (ix-xvi) (source system: system B) on the OSI task
Adversarial
Strength
Attack ix Attack x Attack xi Attack xii Attack xiii Attack xiv Attack xv Attack xvi
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
ASR
(%)
UTR
(%)
κ = 0 2.0 4.0 5.0 12.0 5.0 5.0 14.0 28.0 15.0 26.0 11.0 17.0 11.0 11.0 10.0 22.0
0 < κ < 7 6.0 8.0 53.0 53.0 100.0 100.0 70.0 70.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 56.0 56.0

(
intra-gender
inter-gender
)
× API×
 OSICSI
SV
× decision and scores
+ OSICSI
SV
× API× decision-only
+ OSICSI
SV
× over-the-air× decision and scores
+
OSI× over-the-air× decision-only

C. Visual Distortions for Different Values of the Parameter 
In Fig. 9, we present the intuitive illustration of distortions
under different distance constraint  from 0.05, 0.01, 0.005,
0.004, 0.003, 0.002, to 0.001, where the blue lines represent
the distortion. It is obvious that the smaller the value of  is,
the less noticeable the perturbation is. Though there may be
a gap between vision and listening of human, it is reasonable
to believe that smaller  makes the adversarial voice more
imperceptible to human listening.
D. Results of Tuning the Parameter 
Table XII shows the results of tuning the parameter  on
both ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for the CSI task.
To choose a suitable , we need to trade off the imperceptibility
and the attack cost. Smaller  contributes to less perturbation
(i.e, higher SNR), but also give rise to the attack cost (i.e, more
number of iterations and execution time and lower success
rate). We found that 0.002 is a more suitable value for  for two
reasons: (1) compared with 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.004, 0.003, the
average SNR of adversarial voices when  = 0.002 is higher,
indicating that  = 0.002 introduces less perturbation, while
the success rate of 0.002 is merely 1% lower than that of 0.05,
0.01, 0.005, 0.004 and 0.003. (2)  = 0.001 introduce less
perturbation than  = 0.002, but the success rate of  = 0.001
drops to 41% for ivector-PLDA and 87% for GMM-UBM,
58% and 12% lower than that of  = 0.002. Moreover, the
attack cost increases more sharply when decreasing  from
0.002 to 0.001 compared with decreasing  from 0.003 to
0.002. That is, the number of iterations and execution time
of  = 0.002 are 1.6 times and 1.4 times of that of  = 0.003,
while the number of iterations and execution time of  = 0.001
are 2.2 times and 2.4 times of that of  = 0.002.
E. Transferability Attack Result of Attack i-Attack xvi
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the transferability results of attacks
(i-viii) on the OSI and SV tasks, respectively. The adversarial
voices are crafted on the GMM-UBM source system (i.e.,
system A in Table VIII) and transferred to the other eight
systems (i.e., systems B-I in Table VIII). Table XIV, Table XV
and Table XVI show the transferability results of attacks (ix-
xvi) on the CSI, SV and OSI tasks, respectively.
For the CSI and OSI tasks, both ASR and UTR of κ > 0 are
greater than that of κ = 0, indicating that increasing the ad-
versarial strength makes adversarial voices more transferable.
For the SV task, compared to when κ = 0, more adversarial
voices generated on the source system remain adversarial (i.e.,
being accepted) on target systems when κ > 0. For the CSI
task, when 0 < κ < 16, more than 84% of the adversarial
voices generated on the source system are misclassified by all
the eight target systems. For the SV task, when κ = 0, the
maximal ASR is 16.0% (attack xiv), while when 0 < κ < 7,
the maximal ASR increases to 100% (attack xiv and xv). For
the OSI task, considering attacks (x-xvi) whose corresponding
systems (i.e., system C-I) has the same architecture (i.e.,
ivector-PLDA) with the source system (system B), when
0 < κ < 7, attack x holds the lowest UTR and ASR, and
attack xvi holds the 2nd lowest UTR and ASR among the
eights attacks. Notice that the target systems of attack x and
attack xvi are system C and system I, respectively. System
C is trained on a disjoint dataset from the source system,
and compared with systems (D-H), system I shares the least
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parameters in common with the source system. This reveals
that the larger the difference between the source and target
systems is, the more difficult the transferability attack is.
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